We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the …rst LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base.
Introduction
As network industries continue to open up to competition around the world, the terms under which various networks interconnect have increasingly become the subject of public and regulatory debate. Interconnections are particularly important in the telecommunications industry where competition has developed faster than in other network industries. In the U.S., current regulation of interconnection among telecommunication carriers may be classi…ed into interconnections among competing local exchange carriers (LECs) and interconnections between LECs and Interexchange carriers (IXCs). The …rst type of interconnections is, pursuant to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, mandatory, and requires LECs to negotiate reciprocal compensation rates for calls made by subscribers of one LEC to subscribers of another LEC. The second type of interconnections is regulated pursuant to a series of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) orders and rules.
These orders and rules mandate interconnection between LECs and IXCs while placing a cap on the interconnection fees that LECs charge IXCs. Strict regulation of access to a network's subscriber base also characterizes other network industries such as cable TV and electricity. The idea behind the reforms in network industries was to replace regulation with competition. In the case of telecommunications, U.S. courts and the FCC have stressed "Congress's directive that the [FCC] replace regulation with competition to the greatest extent possible consistent with the public interest ... competitive markets are far better than regulatory agencies at allocating resources and services e¢ciently for the maximum bene…t of consumers."
2 At the same time, regulators remain concerned that competitive forces would not su¢ce to restrain the rates and conditions that networks set for granting other networks access to their customer base.
This paper examines a simple and extremely e¤ective market force that could justify (either partial or complete) deregulation of interconnections: The ability of one network, seeking access to another network's customer base, to transit tra¢c to and from the other network via a third Our model focuses on an IXC that faces two interconnected LECs and needs to pay them interconnection fees for long-distance calls that either originate or terminate at their networks.
Contrary to the current regime, in which interconnection between LECs and IXCs is heavily regulated, interconnection between the LECs and the IXC in our model is completely deregulated.
This is because we are interested in …nding out whether competitive transit can replace regulation.
An important feature of the model is that the IXC need not interconnect directly with both LECs;
instead it can interconnect with a single LEC and transit calls to and from the other LEC via the …rst LEC. Anticipating their dealings with the IXC, the LECs negotiate either a positive or a negative reciprocal access fee for transited tra¢c that ‡ows between their networks so as to boost their access revenue from dealing with the IXC. 4 We therefore examine how, if at all, the reciprocal access fee that the two LECs negotiate should be regulated in order to restrain the interconnection fees that LECs charge the IXC with no need for further regulatory intervention.
We show that if the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance tra¢c are equal, both
LECs will voluntarily interconnect with the IXC at no charge, irrespective of the value of the reciprocal access fee that the LECs have negotiated before dealing with the IXC. Interestingly, this outcome is equivalent to that under mandatory interconnection with a "bill and keep" regime which was recently proposed by the FCC. Under this regime, all LEC interconnection charges are 3 The practice of sending tra¢c to one network via another network is very common and is often referred to as "least cost routing." Transit arrangements are common between Internet backbones: when backbone A purchases transit access from backbone B, it typically gains access to all backbones interconnected with backbone B (see Crémer, Rey, and Tirole, 2000, and Kende 2000) . Transit arrangements are also common in international telecommunication.
Two countries can interconnect by transiting calls through a third country (see, e.g., FCC Releases 1996 International Tra¢c Data, 1998 FCC LEXIS 363, *12-13, 1998 LEC, see e.g., Texcom, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., FCC Record, vol. 17, p. 6275 (2002) (discussing a dispute between a cellular network and a LEC that transited calls ‡owing between the competing LEC and the cellular network). 4 Troughtout the paper we refer to the price that the LECs pay one another for transited long-distance tra¢c as "access fee" and refer to the prices that the IXC pays the two LECs as "interconnection fees." regulated down to zero, unless the interconnecting networks agree otherwise. 5 Transit has the obvious advantage that it leads to voluntary interconnection at no charge without a need for any regulatory intervention.
In contrast, when the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance tra¢c are unequal, the two LECs would strategically set the reciprocal access fee for transited long-distance tra¢c so as to force the IXC to o¤er them higher interconnection fees. This strategic behavior on the LECs' part may force the IXC to pay the two LECs excessively high interconnection fees. Nonetheless, we show that it is still possible to achieve the same outcome as in a "bill and keep" regime by mandating that the LECs will transit long-distance calls to one another at no charge. Given this requirement, the two LECs will voluntarily agree to interconnect with the IXC at no charge without a need for directly regulating their interconnection with the IXC. We also show that when the IXC can price discriminate between direct and transited long-distance calls (and has all the bargaining power vis-a-vis the two LECs) then the IXC will be able to interconnect with both LECs at cost without a need for any type of regulation.
The literature on access pricing is relatively new but is rapidly growing (see Armstrong   2002 for a comprehensive literature survey). Woroch (1996a, 1996b) examine competition between interconnected networks and …nd that a dominant network can price squeeze an entrant by setting a higher price for o¤-net calls than for on-net calls. But, when access charges must be reciprocal, the price di¤erence between on-net and o¤-net calls disappears and monopoly becomes less likely. Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) show that whenever networks compete with one another by setting uniform per-call prices, an above-cost reciprocal access fee can be used as an instrument of tacit collusion. The reason for this is that an above-cost access fee induces each network to raise its per-call price above its rivals' price in order to induce its subscribers to make fewer o¤-net calls than they receive and thereby ensure that the network enjoys an access surplus. La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a,b) show that this conclusion no longer holds when networks can either use nonlinear prices and/or price discriminate between on-net and o¤-net calls. With nonlinear prices, networks can compete for market share by lowering their …xed fees without having to lower their usage fees and thereby increasing their access de…cit.
Hence there is no need to use the reciprocal access fee as a way to guarantee high retail prices.
Under price discrimination, high access fees may intensify retail price competition because each network has a stronger incentive to build market share in order to save on the volume of (costly) o¤-net calls. 6 Carter and Wright (2003) extend the Tirole (1998a, 1998b) model and consider the case of asymmetric networks. They show that under two-part tari¤s, the larger network will always prefer a reciprocal access fee equal to cost, while the smaller network may prefer an above-cost reciprocal access fee for moderate levels of asymmetry. Valletti and Cambini (2003) endogenize the potential asymmetry between the networks by introducing a preliminary stage in which the networks invest in their quality of service. Since in their model subscribers make more calls when the network's quality is higher, an above-cost reciprocal access fee will give the higher quality network an access de…cit vis-a-vis the lower quality network. As a result, the networks prefer to set an above-cost access fee in order to soften the competition between them in the investment stage. Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2002) extend the La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a,b) framework to consider heterogeneous consumers. Peitz (2003) shows that regulating access prices to ensure that only an entrant enjoys an access markup enhances the likelihood of entry and, given entry, makes competition between the entrant and incumbent more intense.
None of these papers, however, studied the interaction between two interconnected networks and a third network which is the main focus of our paper. Moreover, in our paper, the reciprocal access fee does not a¤ect competition between the interconnected networks but rather a¤ects their interaction with a third network that seeks access to their subscribers. The closest papers to ours are Carter and Wright (1999) and Wright (2002) . They consider two networks that compete for customers and set access fees that a third network must pay them for access. They show that when the competing networks set unilateral access fees and use two-part retail tari¤s, they both wish to raise their access fees and use the resulting revenue as a way to subsidize their …xed retail charges in an attempt to attract more subscribers and boost their respective market share. This will lead to escalation of the unilateral access fees. This escalation can be mitigated or even completely eliminated if the two networks must agree on a common access fee. These papers, however, do not consider the possibility of competitive transit, which is the main focus of our paper. Finally, Gilo (2003) discusses the legal and regulatory implications of relying on transit as a market force that could restrain access charges.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework. Section 3 derives the interconnection fees that the IXC would o¤er and characterizes the reciprocal access 6 Gans and King (2001) and Berger (2002) show that with price discrimination between on-net and o¤-net calls, low, rather than high, interconnect fees can be used to soften price competition among networks.
fee that the two LECs would choose in anticipation of the IXC's o¤er. Access price discrimination is examined in Section 4 and the case in which the LECs o¤er interconnection fees to the IXC is examined in Section 5. Concluding remarks appear in Section 6.
The model
Consider two interconnected networks facing a third network that seeks access to their customer base. For the sake of concreteness, we refer to the two interconnected networks as Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) and to the third network as an Interexchange Carrier (IXC) although our analysis may also apply to other cases. For instance, the third network could be an ISP or an internet backbone seeking access to the LECs' or to cable carriers' customer base, or an electricity generator or retailer seeking access to the transmission grids of interconnected electric utilities.
In order to focus on the interaction between the two LECs and the IXC, we abstract from competition in the local exchange market and consider the following three-stage game: In the …rst stage, the two LECs negotiate a reciprocal per-call access fee a for transited tra¢c that ‡ows between their networks. 7 The access fee a is paid by the sending network to the receiving network.
In the second stage, the IXC o¤ers the two LECs contracts, (p 1 ; b p 1 ) and (p 2 ; b p 2 ), where p 1 and p 2 are the per-call interconnection fees that the IXC will pay the two LECs for inbound and outbound long-distance calls if both LECs interconnect with the IXC, and b p i is the per-call interconnection fee for inbound and outbound calls that the IXC will pay LEC i = 1; 2 if only LEC i interconnects with the IXC. In the third and last stage of the game, the two LECs simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the IXC's o¤er. If LEC j rejects the IXC's o¤er while LEC i accepts it, longdistance calls to and from LEC j's customers will be transited via LEC i's network. 8 If both LECs reject the IXC's o¤ers, the customers of the two LECs cannot receive or make long-distance calls (in equilibrium of course this is never the case).
Let Q 1 and Q 2 be the volumes of inbound long-distance calls that customers of LECs 1 and 2 receive and mQ 1 and mQ 2 the corresponding volumes of outbound long-distance calls. That 7 In Michigan Bell Telephone Company v. Chappelle, 222 F. Supp. 2d 905, 917-918 (2002) , the federal district court held that federal law does not deal with the issue of access that a LEC provides for transited calls and that this issue is left to the state law governing the operations of the LEC. Hence, the access fee a need not be equal to the access fee that the LECs set for local calls made between their respective customers. 8 For call termination, the IXC can simply route the calls to LEC j via LEC i's network. In the case of call origination, the IXC can ask its LEC j's customers to dial up a special access code that routes their outbound calls
is, we assume that there is a constant ratio, m¸0, between outbound and inbound long-distance calls and that this ratio is the same for both LECs. Although in general m is strictly positive, there are important cases in which m = 0 (i.e., no outbound tra¢c). Examples for such "oneway-access" situations include ISPs seeking access to LECs' or cable carriers customers base and electricity generators or retailers seeking access to electric utilities' transmission grids. To simplify matters, we assume that Q 1 and Q 2 are independent of the interconnection fees that the IXC pays the two LECs. Admittedly, this assumption is restrictive and should be relaxed in future research.
However, at least in the case of the U.S., this assumption can be partly justi…ed on the grounds that IXCs are required by the FCC to average their costs across all of their subscribers regardless of the LEC they subscribe to. 9 Consequently, the interconnection fees of one LEC, especially if it is relatively small, will have only a small impact on the retail long-distance tari¤s and hence on the volume of long-distance tra¢c. Without a loss of generality, we will assume that Q 1¸Q2 :
the volume of long-distance calls is greater in LEC 1 than in LEC 2. Accordingly, we will often refer to LEC 1 as the "big LEC" and LEC 2 as the "small LEC."
The LECs incur per-call costs c for trunk transmission, c o for call origination, and c t for call termination. Hence, when a LEC is directly interconnected with the IXC, the costs of originating and terminating long-distance calls, respectively, are c + c o and c + c t . When long-distance calls are transited, there is an additional trunk transmission cost c since the transited calls are routed through the networks of both LECs. Hence, transit is ine¢cient. Yet, as we shall see, transit may arise if the access fee, a, that the LECs negotiate for transited tra¢c that ‡ows between their networks is relatively high.
We now turn to the LECs' pro…ts. The pro…t of LEC i when both LECs are interconnected with the IXC is
The …rst term represents LEC i's pro…t on inbound long-distance calls while the second term represents its pro…t on outbound calls. In both cases, LEC i collects from the IXC per-call interconnection fee, p i ; and bears the associated costs. If LEC i interconnects with the IXC while LEC j does not, then LEC i's pro…t is
In the opposite case where only LEC j interconnects with the IXC, LEC i's pro…t is
The …rst two terms in ¼ i (Y; N) represent LEC i's pro…t on long-distance calls that terminate and originate at its own network, while the last two terms represent LEC i's pro…t on calls that are transited to and from LEC j's network. LEC i then pays LEC j a per-call access fee a on inbound calls that terminate at LEC j's network but receives from LEC j a per-call access fee a on outbound calls that originate at LEC j's network. ¼ i (N; Y ) has a corresponding interpretation.
Equilibrium
To characterize the (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the three-stage game described in the previous section, we …rst solve the third stage of the game in which the two LECs simultaneously decide whether or not to accept the IXC's o¤er. We then turn to the second stage of the game in which the IXC makes o¤ers to the two LECs in anticipation of their responses in the third stage. Finally we consider the …rst stage of the game in which the two LECs determine their reciprocal access fee, a, for transited tra¢c.
The interconnection fees
Given the IXC's o¤ers, (p 1 ; b p 1 ) and (p 2 ; b p 2 ), the payo¤ matrix in the third stage of the game is given by
If the IXC wishes to interconnect with both LECs, it must induce a unique Nash equilibrium at (Accept, Accept). To this end, the IXC's o¤ers (p 1 ; b p 1 ) and (p 2 ; b p 2 ) must satisfy the conditions (i)
(we assume that when indi¤erent, LECs accept the IXC's o¤er). Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that (Accept, Accept) is a Nash equilibrium, while conditions (iii) and (iv) ensure that (Reject, Reject) is not a Nash equilibrium. Conditions (i) and (ii) require that
while conditions (iii) and (iv) require that b p 1 and b p 2 are su¢ciently large.
On the other hand, if the IXC wishes to interconnect exclusively with LEC 1, then it must induce a unique Nash equilibrium at (Accept, Reject). Therefore,
Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that (Accept, Reject) is a Nash equilibrium, while either conditions (iii) or (iv) ensures that (Reject, Accept) is not a Nash equilibrium. Condition (i) and (iii) are equivalent to p 2 < ³ 1¡m 1+m´a < p 1 , condition (iv) requires that b p 2 would be su¢ciently small (say 0), and condition (ii) is equivalent to
where K´c
1+m is a weighted average of the cost of call origination, c o and call termination, c t , and°´Q
is the share of long-distance calls that originate and terminate at LEC 1's network.
The fee b p ¤ 1 is equal to the average cost of LEC 1 when it interconnects exclusively with the IXC. These average costs consist of the transmission cost, c, plus a weighted average of K (the cost of originating and terminating calls) and a (the cost of access), with the weights being equal to the proportion of calls that terminate in LEC 1's own network and the proportion of calls that are transited to LEC 2's network.
Analogously, to interconnect exclusively with LEC 2, the IXC's o¤er must be such that
p 1 should be su¢ciently small (say 0), and b p 2 should be such that
where b p ¤ 2 is the average cost of LEC 2 when it interconnects exclusively with the IXC. Using (4)-(6) we establish the following result:
Proposition 1: (The interconnection fees) The IXC will interconnect with both LECs and will pay them a per-call fee
Otherwise, the IXC will interconnect exclusively with LEC 1 and will pay it a per-call fee b
Proof: Since the IXC wishes to minimizes its per-call access charges, it will o¤er ³ 1¡m 1+m´a if it wishes to interconnect with both LECs and b p ¤ i if it wishes to interconnect exclusively with LEC i. Using (5) and (6),
There are now two possibilities:
1+m´a , then the IXC will either interconnect with both LECs or will interconnect exclusively with LEC 2. But since K¸³
so the IXC will interconnect with both LECs and will pay them
1+m´a , then the IXC will either interconnect with both LECs or will interconnect exclusively with LEC 1. Noting that
the IXC will either interconnect with both LECs and will pay them
ut will interconnect exclusively with LEC 1 and will pay it b
¥
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. To interconnect with both LECs, the IXC needs to o¤er the two LECs an interconnection fee
1+m´a since this is the net per-call access revenue that each LEC can receive by rejecting the IXC's o¤er and transiting all inbound and outbound long-distance calls via the rival LEC's network. 10 On the other hand, if the IXC wishes to interconnect exclusively with LEC i, then rejecting the IXC's o¤er means that neither LEC will be interconnected with the IXC. Hence, to induce LEC i to agree to an exclusive interconnection, 1 0 Note that ³ 1¡m 1+m´a could be negative in which case the LECs pay the IXC for interconnection rather than vice versa.
³ 1¡m 1+m´a will be negative if either m > 1 (more outbound than inbound long-distance calls) and a > 0, or when m < 1 (more inbound than outbound long-distance calls) and a < 0. is relatively large, it is cheaper for the IXC to interconnect exclusively with LEC 1.
Proposition 1 has at least two important implications. First, transit is ine¢cient since each transited call is transmitted through the networks of both LECs and hence involves an additional trunk transmission cost of c. Hence, Corollary 1: (E¢ciency) The equilibrium is ex post e¢cient only when
Otherwise, long-distance calls to and from LEC 2's customers are ine¢ciently transited via LEC 1's network.
Second, as mentioned in the Introduction, the FCC has recently proposed a new "bill and keep" regime according to which all LECs' interconnection charges will be regulated to 0 unless the interconnecting networks agree otherwise. Proposition 1 shows that whenever m = 1 (the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance calls are equal), p ¤ 1 = p ¤ 2 = 0. That is, competitive transit induces the LEC to interconnect with the IXC at no charge without any need for regulatory intervention. Intuitively, if LEC i refuses to interconnect with the IXC, then its long-distance calls are transited via LEC j's network. But since m = 1, the resulting access revenue (on inbound calls if a > 0 and outbound calls if a < 0) is just equal to the access expenditure (on outbound calls if a > 0 and inbound calls if a < 0). That is, LEC i just breaks even on long-distance calls if it does not interconnect with the IXC. Consequently, the IXC can induce both LECs to interconnect with it at 0 interconnection fee.
By contrast, when the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance calls are unequal (i.e., m 6 = 1), Proposition 1 shows that in general, the IXC will have to pay the LECs interconnection fees that are di¤erent than 0. However, if the reciprocal access fee, a; is regulated to 0, then the two LECs would be willing to interconnect with the IXC at no charge. Again, the intuition for this is that by refusing to interconnect with the IXC, the net income of each LEC from long-distance calls (that are now transited through the network of the rival LEC) is 0. Once again, it is possible to replicate the outcome of a "bill and keep outcome" regime for LEC-IXC interconnection without having to directly regulate the interconnection fees that the LECs charge the IXC.
Corollary 2: (Replicating a "bill and keep outcome" regime with competitive transit) The IXC will interconnect with both LECs at 0 fees if either the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance calls are equal (i.e., m = 1) or if the reciprocal access fee that the LECs charge one another, a, is equal to 0:
In practice, direct regulation of LEC-IXC interconnection should address not only the interconnection fees that IXCs pay the LECs, but also an array of additional factors, such as the quality of interconnection, technical standards, and repair services (see Gilo 2003 for details). Corollary 2 suggests that in order to achieve a "bill and keep outcome" there is no need to regulate LEC-IXC interconnection: instead, it is enough to add an additional provision to the regulation of LEC-LEC interconnections (which is regulated anyway for various reasons) stating that LECs should transit long-distance calls to one another at no charge.
11 Clearly then, competitive transit can lower the regulatory burden needed to enforce "bill and keep" outcomes.
The choice of the reciprocal access fee
In this subsection we turn to the …rst stage of the game in which the two LECs negotiate their reciprocal access fee, a. Our main purpose is to examine the preferences of the two LECs over a -we will not postulate a particular bargaining game and attempt to solve for a speci…c value of a.
Using equation (1) and Proposition 1, the pro…ts of the two LECs, as functions of a, are
and With equations (7) and (8) in place, we are ready to examine the preferences of the two LECs over the reciprocal access fee, a.
Proposition 2: (The choice of the reciprocal access fee)
² If m = 1, the two LECs are indi¤erent to the value of the reciprocal access fee, a.
² If m 6 = 1, the big LEC, LEC 1 will prefer to set a such that
which in turn induces the IXC to interconnect with both LECs at K + c=°. By contrast, the small LEC, LEC 2, will prefer to set a as negative as possible if m > 1 and as large as possible if m < 1.
² The equilibrium is e¢cient only if jaj ·¯1
When the IXC interconnects with both LECs, it o¤ers them a per-call interconnection fee ³ 1¡m 1+m´a to ensure that the pro…t of each LEC i is just equal to ¼ i (N; Y ) which is LEC i's pro…t from rejecting the IXC's o¤er and transiting all inbound and outbound long-distance calls via LEC j's network. As (3) shows, ¼ i (N; Y ) is independent of a when m = 1, implying that in this case the LECs are indi¤erent to the value of a. When m > 1 (m < 1), ¼ i (N; Y ) is decreasing (increasing) with a since the LEC's total expenditure on outbound calls is larger (smaller) than its total revenue from inbound calls. Hence, the two LECs wish to set a negative (positive) a to boost their pro…ts from long-distance tra¢c. But, as jaj >¯1 +m 1¡m¯³ K + c°´, the IXC o¤ers interconnection fees such that LEC 2 refuses to interconnect with the IXC. In this case, if LEC 1 rejects the IXC's o¤er as well, no LEC will interconnect with the IXC and LEC 1's pro…t will be 0. The IXC can therefore o¤er LEC 1 a fee b p ¤ 1 that leaves LEC 1 with a 0 pro…t. Obviously then, LEC 1 does not want jaj to exceed¯1
On the other hand, LEC 2 prefers to raise jaj as much as possible.
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Interestingly, Carter and Wright (2003) also …nd that a large network will prefer a low reciprocal access fee while the smaller network may prefer a high reciprocal access fee. Their model however only considers tra¢c between the two networks: there are no calls to and from a third network as in our model. Proposition 2 has several interesting implications. First, at LEC 1's ideal a, the IXC interconnects with both LECs and pays them an interconnection fee of K + c°p er-call. This fee decreases with°which is the share of long-distance tra¢c that originates and terminates at the big LEC, LEC 1. To the extent that a low ideal a for LEC 1 will translate to a low a, we can draw the following conclusion: Moreover, unless m = 1, the small LEC, LEC 2, would like to raise jaj as much as possible, whereas the big LEC, LEC 1, would like to raise jaj only up to¯1 +m 1¡m¯³ K + c°´. But, if transit is not mandatory (each LEC can refuse to transit calls to the rival LEC), then LEC 1 can threaten LEC 2 that if jaj >¯1 +m 1¡m¯³ K + c°´, LEC 1 will refuse to transit long-distance calls to LEC 2. This threat is credible since whenever jaj >¯1 +m 1¡m¯³ K + c°´, the IXC o¤ers LEC 1 an interconnection fee b p ¤ 1 such that LEC 1 just breaks even on long-distance calls and hence gains nothing from transiting calls to LEC 2. In contrast, if transit is mandatory, then (at least in principle) LEC 2 might be able to force LEC 1 to agree to set jaj above¯1 ² If m 6 = 1, then both LECs can bene…t from agreeing to transit long-distance calls to one another. Moreover, allowing LEC 1 to refuse to transit long-distance calls to and from LEC 2 enables LEC 1 to force LEC 2 to agree to set the access fee, a, equal to
hich is LEC 1's ideal access fee when m 6 = 1.
To the extent that it is socially desirable to keep jaj (and thereby the interconnection fees) low, Corollary 4 suggests that it may be a poor idea to force the LECs to transit longdistance calls to each other: under mandatory transit, the reciprocal access fee may be set such that jaj >¯1 +m 1¡m¯³ K + c°´; in which case the IXC will ine¢ciently interconnect exclusively with LEC 1: By contrast, when LEC 1's can refuse to transit long-distance calls to LEC 2, a is at most equal to
1¡m´³ K + c°´a nd the IXC interconnects with both LECs.
Access price discrimination
In this section we consider the case in which the IXC can o¤er the LECs interconnection fees that depend on whether calls originate or terminate at a LEC's network or are transited to and from the rival LEC. That is, we consider the case where the IXC can price discriminate between calls depending on their destination. Speci…cally, let p 11 and p 22 be the interconnection fees that the IXC o¤ers the two LECs for calls that originate or terminate at their own networks, and p ij be the interconnection fee that the IXC o¤ers LEC i for calls that originate or terminate at LEC j and are transited via LEC i's network. Let b p ii and b p be the corresponding interconnection fees when only LEC i accepts the IXC's o¤er.
Proposition 3: (Price discrimination). Suppose that the IXC can price discriminate between longdistance calls that terminate in a LEC's network and calls that are transited to the rival LEC. Then, the two LECs will set a reciprocal access fee a = ³ 1+m 1¡m´( K + c) and the IXC will interconnect with both LECs and will pay each LEC an interconnection fee K + c per-call. 
. If LEC i rejects the o¤er, then LEC j will surely accept it since with b p jj = K + c and b
exactly as in the case where LEC j rejects the IXC's o¤er as well (in which case no LEC is interconnected with the IXC); we assume that when indi¤erent, a LEC accepts the IXC's o¤er.
Since LEC j accepts the IXC's o¤er, LEC i will receive its long-distance calls via LEC j's network and its pro…t is given by
and
1+m´a is the minimal interconnection fee that will induce both LECs to accept the IXC's o¤er.
1+m´a¸K + c, then the IXC would concede rents to the LECs if it were to make the above o¤ers. Therefore, the IXC can modify its o¤er by setting p 11 = p 22 = K + c and b p 12 = b p 21 = 1. Now, if a LEC refuses to interconnect with the IXC, its pro…t will be 0 since with
, the IXC will never transit calls to this LEC via the rival LEC's network. With p 11 = p 22 = K + c, both LECs will accept the IXC's o¤er since at these interconnection fees, they both break even on long-distance calls.
Given the IXC's o¤er, the LECs lose money on long-distance calls if In the resulting equilibrium, the IXC will interconnect with both LECs and will pay an interconnection fee K + c on each call. ¥ Proposition 3 shows that under access price discrimination, the interconnection fees that the IXC pays the two LECs are equal to those that would obtain in the absence of transit. The idea behind this result is as follows. To induce a LEC to interconnect with the IXC at minimal fees, the IXC must o¤er each LEC i an interconnection fee that leaves LEC i as well o¤ as in the case where it rejects the IXC's o¤er. If ³ 1¡m 1+m´a < K + c; LEC i would lose money by refusing to interconnect with the IXC and transiting all long-distance calls via LEC j's network. The minimal interconnection fee that the IXC needs to o¤er LEC i in this case is ³ 1¡m 1+m´a , which by design, leaves LEC i with a loss on each long-distance call. However when ³ 1¡m 1+m´a¸K + c, transiting long-distance calls via LEC j's network is not a losing proposition anymore for LEC i. Hence, if transit is an option, the IXC must o¤er each LEC i an interconnection fee that leaves the LEC a positive rent. But, when the IXC can price discriminate between direct and transited long-distance calls, it can credibly commit not to send or receive such calls by raising the interconnection fee on transited calls to a prohibitive level. 13 As a result, a LEC can o¤er its customers access to longdistance calls only if it interconnects directly with the IXC: transit is not a viable option anymore.
Since the IXC can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the two LECs, it can o¤er them interconnection fees that just cover their costs but leave them no rent. A similar strategy is impossible in the no discrimination case since the IXC must set the same interconnection fee for direct and transited long-distance calls and therefore has no way of credibly committing to block transited calls. The two LECs can therefore take advantage of that and set up a high access price a that forces the IXC to o¤er them higher interconnection fees.
By revealed preferences, it is not surprising that the ability to price discriminate between direct and transited calls bene…ts the IXC. Proposition 3 shows however that access price discrimination may also be welfare enhancing by leading to lower interconnection fees and by ensuring that the IXC will eventually interconnect with both LECs. The reason why price discrimination leads to a lower reciprocal access fee, a, is that if the LECs would try to set a high a as in the no discrimination case, the IXC would set a prohibitively high fee on transit calls and would thereby commit not to send or receive such calls. This lowers the disagreement payo¤s of the two LECs and would force them to accept lower interconnection fees.
The LECs make o¤ers
Thus far, we have assumed that the IXC has all the bargaining power vis-a-vis the two LECs and can make them take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. In this section we examine the opposite polar case in which the LECs have all the bargaining power vis-a-vis the IXC.
Let (r 1 ; b r 1 ) and (r 2 ; b r 2 ) be the contracts that the two LECs o¤er the IXC, where r i is the per-call interconnection fee that LEC i demands in case each LEC receives its long-distance calls directly from the IXC, and b r i is the per-call interconnection fee if the IXC interconnects exclusively with LEC i. We assume that the LECs do not price discriminate between direct and transited calls. 14 The IXC can either accept or reject each o¤er. If it accepts both o¤ers, its total expenditure on interconnection fees is (1 + m) (Q 1 r 1 + Q 2 r 2 ), while if it interconnects only with
, it follows that the IXC will interconnect with both LECs if and only if°r
If (12) fails, the IXC will interconnect exclusively with the LEC that demands the minimum between b r 1 and b r 2 . If b r 1 = b r 2 , the IXC will pick one of the two LECs at random and will interconnect exclusively with that LEC. Consequently, LEC i's expected pro…t is
if (12) fails and b r i < b r j ;
; if (12) fails and b r j = b r i ;
Using (13) we now characterize the equilibrium o¤ers of the two LECs and the IXC's response.
Proposition 4: (The interconnection fees when the LECs make o¤ers to the IXC) Suppose that the LECs can simultaneously make o¤ers to the IXC. Then the equilibrium o¤ers, (r ¤ 1 ; b r ¤ 1 ) and (r ¤ 2 ; b r ¤ 2 ) will be such that
1+m´a + c, and
The IXC will accept both o¤ers and will transfer long-distance calls directly to each LEC. The resulting equilibrium will therefore be e¢cient.
Proof: First note that in equilibrium, (12) must hold with equality, otherwise each LEC i can make more money by raising r i slightly. Second, note that (12) cannot fail: if it does and b r i < b r j , then LEC i can make more money by raising b r i slightly. If (12) fails and b r 1 = b r 2 , then LEC i's expected pro…t is given by the expression in the third line of (13). If this expression falls short of the expression in the fourth line of (13), it pays LEC i to raise b r i . If the expression in the third line of (13) is at least as large as that in the fourth line of (13), then it pays LEC i to lower b r i slightly. Hence, in equilibrium, (12) must hold with equality and LEC i's pro…t is given by the expression in the top line in (13).
Since (12) holds with equality, we will restrict attention to cases in which b
where (12) implies that b r ¤ =°r ¤ 1 + (1 ¡°) r ¤ 2 . We do so because given r 1 and r 2 , there exists a continuum of equilibria that di¤er only with respect to the value of max fb r 1 ; b r 2 g. But since all of these equilibria are payo¤ equivalent, it is natural to focus on symmetric cases in which b r 1 = b r 2 = b r.
Now, note that raising r i and b r i will violate (12); since b r i will exceed b r ¤ ; the IXC will interconnect exclusively with LEC j so LEC i's pro…t will become Q i (a ¡ c ¡ c t ) ¡ mQ i (a + c + c o ). To ensure that this deviation is unpro…table, it must be that in equilibrium,
or equivalently, r ¤ 1¸³ 1¡m 1+m´a and r ¤ 2¸³ 1¡m
1+m´a . Likewise, lowering b r i slightly will violate (12) and induce the IXC to interconnect exclusively with LEC i; in which case its pro…t will be almost
To ensure that this deviation is unpro…table, it must be that in
where the last equality follows because (12) holds with equality. Inequality (14) requires that
1+m´a + c; i = 1; 2. We complete the proof by showing that any triplet (r ¤ 1 ; r ¤ 2 ; b r ¤ ) such that
1+m´a + c, and b r ¤ =°r ¤ 1 + (1 ¡°) r ¤ 2 can be an equilibrium. In equilibrium, LEC i's pro…t is given by the top line of (14). Fixing LEC j's o¤er, let's consider possible deviations for LEC i. Raising both r i and b r i will induce the IXC to interconnect exclusively with LEC j, so LEC i's pro…t will be by the fourth line in (13); since r ¤ i¸³ 1¡m 1+m´a , such a deviation does not increase LEC i's pro…t. Raising r i while lowering b r i below b r ¤ will induce the IXC to interconnect exclusively with LEC i. The resulting pro…t of LEC i will be less than the expression in the middle line of (14) Proposition 4 has several interesting implications. First, the interconnection fees depend only on the reciprocal access fee, a, the cost of transmission, c, and the ratio of outbound to inbound tra¢c, m, but are independent of the shares of the two LECs in the long-distance tra¢c,°and 1¡°, and the costs of call termination, c t , and call origination, c o . The fact that the interconnection fees are independent of the LECs' costs of originating and terminating long-distance calls is akin to the "o¤-net-cost pricing principle" of La¤ont et al. (2003) . According to this principle, internet backbones set their retail price as if their connections were entirely o¤-net. Here the relevant prices are not retail prices but rather interconnection fees that the IXC pays; nonetheless, these fees are set as if all tra¢c was transited to the rival LEC (i.e., on the basis of the o¤-net costs, c+ ³ 1¡m 1+m´a ). Second, the equilibrium payo¤ of each LEC i is given by the top line of (14) with
1+m´a + c: Hence, as in the case where the IXC makes o¤ers, the LECs can strategically use a as a way to boost their pro…ts at the IXC's expense. However, unlike in the case where the IXC makes o¤ers, here there is no con ‡ict of interest between the two LECs: both wish to raise jaj as much as possible.
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Corollary 5: (The LECs' preferences over the reciprocal access fee when they make o¤ers to the IXC) If the two LECs can simultaneously make o¤ers to the IXC, then they will both prefer to raise jaj as much as possible.
Third, and again unlike the case where the IXC makes o¤ers, now the two LECs mutually prefer to commit not to transit calls to and from one another. Absent transit, each LEC becomes a monopolist with respect to calls that originate and terminate at its own network and can charge the IXC appropriate interconnection fees. 16 Transit introduces competition between the two LECs and hence weakens their bargaining power vis-a-vis the IXC. By contrast, when the IXC makes o¤ers, 1 5 Again, if the demand for long-distance calls is price elastic, the two LECs will wish to raise a only up to a certain point. 1 6 Carter and Wright (1999) argue that if the LECs compete with one another and use two-part tari¤s, they will transit boosts the LECs bargaining power vis-a-vis the IXC since it allows them, when m 6 = 1, to get a revenue of at least ³ 1¡m 1+m´a on transited calls. Note, however, that so long as transit can be done on a unilateral basis (i.e., it does not require the mutual consent of both LECs), then there does not exist an equilibrium in which both LECs refuse to transit calls to one another. To see why, suppose otherwise and suppose that the monopoly price of LEC i is equal to or below the monopoly price of LEC j. Then, LEC i would o¤er the IXC an exclusive interconnection at a price which is slightly below the monopoly price of LEC j. The IXC will accept the o¤er (this arrangement lowers the IXC's cost of sending and receiving long-distance calls to and from LEC j), thus upsetting the putative equilibrium. Consequently, Corollary 6: (Voluntary transit) Transit makes both LECs worse o¤ relative to the case where they can refuse to transit long-distance calls. However, absent a binding agreement that prohibits transit, the LECs will be unable to commit not to transit calls to and from one another. regulation re ‡ects the concern of regulators that despite competition between networks, access to their customer-base remains a bottleneck monopoly. In this paper, we explored the role that competitive transit can play in this context. We showed that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base.
Our analysis applies to the case of two-way access problems involving interconnected LECs and IXCs as well as to one-way access problems that arise when an ISP seeks access to a LEC or cable carrier's customer base, or an electricity generator or retailer seeks access to a utility's infrastructure. A closely related issue is the termination charges that cellular carriers charge other carriers (wireline or cellular) for calling their subscribers. This issue has been the subject of an ongoing public and regulatory debate in many countries. 18 The general feeling is that, absent access price regulation, cellular carriers will set excessively high termination charges since these charges are not borne by their own subscribers, and hence are not subject to competitive pressures.
Our results suggest that competitive transit could alleviate this problem as well: if the cellular carrier is interconnected with another network (wireline or cellular), the caller's network could access the cellular carrier's subscribers via this other network. Unlike in our model, however, the cellular carrier pays access fees to other networks for calls that originate in its network, whereas in our model, the LECs always receive access fees from the IXC irrespective of whether the calls have originated or were terminated in their own networks. It would therefore be interesting to examine in future research how competitive transit a¤ects the multilateral access fees in such an environment. 
